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Plato's Meno as long been supposed to be one of Plato's 
transitional dialogues. Trying to understand the Meno in this way, 
however, gives rise to a number of problems, not the least of which 
is that positions or arguments from other dialogues are often used 
to interpret the Meno.1 In this paper, I propose to interpret one of 
the more puzzling parts of the Meno by containing my reading to 
just this dialogue and not importing views from other dialogues. 
In the Meno, Plato presents and uses the so-called doctrine of 
recollection to overcome a paradox introduced by the character 
Meno. Interpretations of this dialogue typically have a problem 
explaining the connection between the paradox, the use of the 
doctrine of recollection and the subsequent experiment with the 
slave boy. Some have argued that the doctrine of recollection is 
Plato's initial attempt at presenting his epistemological views. 2 
Others have argued that the doctrine of recollection is the initial 
departure by Plato from the Socratic elenchus} Although I shall 
not address these arguments explicitly, my contention is that these 
interpretations do not address the specific problem, introduced in 
this dialogue, concerning the purpose of inquiry. I shall argue that 
Plato's use of the doctrine of recollection with respect to the 
experiment with the slave boy serves an explanatory function. More 
precisely, I shall argue that this doctrine demonstrates how new 
beliefs are formed and how inquiry can be guided by these beliefs.4 
Before delving in too far, there are at least four reasons we 
should be suspicious of the traditional understanding of the doctrine 
of recollection found in the Meno. First, Socrates' retraction is 
typically overlooked and not taken into consideration. I think this 
is vitally important, because Plato is telling us that there is more 
going on in this section than meets the eye. If we fail to take account 
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of this retraction, then we may be missing the point of this whole 
section of the dialogue. Also, if Plato is retracting some of this 
presentation, then this presupposes that he is aware that there are 
certain fundamental problems that he cannot address. Second, these 
problems in this doctrine that are not specifically addressed are, 
first of all, how does the soul know things in the first place. If 
successive reincarnations of the soul account for the knowledge 
that is present in the soul, then there should be some difference 
between the soul's first incarnation and all successive incarnations. 
If not, then what explanatory role does the soul's numerous 
incarnations play in the account offered. If it is the case that the 
soul is immortal, and has been born many times and, on that basis, 
has experienced all things both here and in the underworld, there 
should be a difference in the knowledge possessed by a soul on 
the first incarnation and that of a soul on its nth incarnation. Since 
the soul, first time around, would only know those things in the 
underworld, or, conversely, only those things experienced of this 
world, and the soul on its, say, 20 t h time around would have 
experienced things both here and yonder, there should be a marked 
difference between the amount of knowledge held by these souls 
or the speed in which they recollect. If there isn't, then what 
difference is there between the first incarnation of a soul with 
respect to the amount of knowledge it contains and the twentieth 
incarnation? If each successive incarnation does not affect the 
overall amount of knowledge or access the soul has to this 
knowledge, then why introduce this notion into the presentation 
of the doctrine? There does not seem to be any indication, in the 
Meno, that each successive incarnation does anything either 
beneficial or detrimental to the soul with respect to its condition 
and access to knowledge. The first incarnation soul is in the same 
condition, with respect to starting points, as the twentieth 
incarnation soul. It also does not appear that the number of 
incarnations of the soul play any role whatsoever in the 
identification of objects in the world. Both the first incarnation 
soul and the twentieth incarnation soul are still subject to the need 
for dialectic and philosophical inquiry. 
Third, even if the doctrine of recollection is taken to be a theory 
of knowledge, it does not explain how we acquire knowledge in 
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the first place. That is, if the successive incarnations of the soul 
explain why a soul has knowledge, how does the soul acquire it in 
the first place? It would seem that upon the initial incarnation, the 
soul would only have experience of those things in the underworld. 
Notice that the presentation of this doctrine does not say that the 
soul has experience of some Platonic heaven with the Forms per 
se. In fact, this dialogue does not even seem to suggest that the 
theory of forms has been formulated, yet, by Plato. All Socrates 
says is that the soul has experience of things both in this world 
and in the underworld. On the first time around, so to speak, the 
soul would only have experience of those things, whatever they 
are, in the underworld. So, how does the soul initially acquire any 
knowledge at all? Finally, how do we graft the slave boy case onto 
the doctrine of recollection? It does not seem as if he is reaching 
into his pre-natal experiences to extract knowledge, but rather that 
he is learning how to answer Socrates' questions. There remains a 
disconnect between the account of the doctrine of recollection and 
the experiment with the slave boy that remains puzzling even in 
the face of Socrates' careful attempt to join the two together. On 
these grounds, we have reason to be suspicious of the traditional 
reading of the doctrine of recollection. 
In order to grapple with these difficulties, I shall, in brief, 
address the initial section of the dialogue, and the particular 
problem presented by the so-called Meno's paradox. I shall then 
address Socrates' presentation of the doctrine of recollection, and 
identify what I call the strong5 and weak versions of it. Next, I 
shall carefully address the experiment with the slave boy and 
provide a reading of this experiment that makes sense of some 
otherwise very puzzling passages within the experiment. I shall 
argue that these previous interpretations do not explain why, at the 
end of the experiment Socrates makes a retraction. In light of this 
retraction, I shall argue that we are justified in attributing only the 
weaker version of the doctrine of recollection to Plato in this 
dialogue. Any attempt to attribute a stronger interpretation of this 
doctrine must explain Socrates' retraction. And, as we shall see, I 
think the prospect of doing this is thin. The main problem 
introduced by Socrates' retraction concerns its scope. What I mean 
by this is that, since Socrates does not insist that his argument is 
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right in all other respects, what parts of the previous argument is 
rejected by this statement? 
In the initial portion of the dialogue, Meno asks Socrates 
whether virtue can be taught, or if it is not teachable, the result of 
practice, or if it is neither of these, but something that men possess 
by nature or does virtue come to men by some other way. 6 Socrates 
insists that if he does not know what something is, he could not 
know what qualities the thing possesses.7 It is important to note 
that throughout this dialogue, Socrates does not abandon this 
position. He says essentially the same thing at lines 86d, "we would 
not have investigated whether virtue is teachable or not before we 
had investigated what virtue itself i s . . . . So, we must, it appears, 
inquire into the qualities of something the nature of which we do 
not yet know." Again, at the end of the dialogue, Socrates says, 
"We shall have clear knowledge of this when, before we investigate 
how it comes to be present in men, we first try to find out what 
virtue in itself is." (Line 100b). In order to understand why the 
paradox is introduced in the first place, we must understand the 
nature of the inquiry taking place in the dialogue. Meno wants an 
answer to his initial question concerning the manner in which we 
acquire virtue.8 Essentially, this question requires an understanding 
of the nature of virtue. The interpretive problem, then, becomes 
one of understanding how to inquire into the nature of something 
the knowledge of which the inquirers do not possess. 
In order to discover an answer to this initial question, Socrates 
asks Meno to tell him what virtue is. We are led through four 
successive definitions. Each of which either contains the term to 
be defined in the definition, or the definition does not take the 
entire subject matter into consideration. These definitions are: 1. 
There is a virtue for every action and every age, for every task of 
ours and every one of us, and the same is true for wickedness. 
(Iine72a); 2. Virtue is the ability to rule over men. (line 73d); 3. 
Virtue is the desire for beautiful things and the power to acquire 
them, (line 77 b); and 4. To act in whatever you do with a part of 
virtue is virtue, (line 79c). Socrates rejects each of these definitions 
in turn, and demonstrates their deficiencies. But, a careful 
examination of these arguments is not the point of this paper. 
Instead, I would like to draw attention to the assistance Socrates 
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provides Meno just after he undermines Meno's attempted 
definitions. 
After each definition and counter argument, Socrates offers 
Meno some suggestions concerning how to better understand what 
Socrates is looking for. For example, the example of the swarm of 
bees and the analogy to Meno's initial definition of virtue 
demonstrates that Socrates is looking for the eidos in virtue of 
which all virtues are virtues. The definitions of shape and color 
that Socrates offers Meno as examples of the sort of definition he 
is looking for demonstrate another aspect of how Socrates 
understands inquiry. Socrates' comparison between the clever and 
disputatious debaters and those who are friends illustrate this 
difference. The clever, disputatious and contentious sort of debater 
would demand refutation before abandoning a view or position. In 
contrast, the friend of discussion offers answers that are not only 
true but in terms admittedly known to the questioner. 
It is worth noting that one difference between Socrates second 
definition of shape, 9 shape is that which limits a solid (line 76b), 
and Socrates definition of color, an effluvium from shapes which 
fits the sight and is perceived (line 76d), which reflects another 
aspect of answering in terms that are not only true but in terms 
admittedly known to the questioner. That is, in the second definition 
of shape Socrates carefully explains to Meno each of the central 
terms of the definition (limit, and solid), and constructs the 
definition on the basis of Meno's admitted understanding of these 
terms only after they have been clearly defined. Just before the 
definition of color, Socrates asks Meno whether he would like 
him to answer in the manner of Gorgias (line 76c), and only focuses 
on Gorgias' acceptance of Empedocles' notion of effluvia. Socrates 
draws off of this notion that there are channels through which some 
effluvia fit and others that are either too big or too small. The 
notion of sight is mentioned but not elaborated. From these notions 
the theatrical (tragike) definition of color is constructed. 
What I find important here is that, in the second definition of 
shape, Socrates himself offers his understanding of the terms 
included in the definition. With the definition of color, there is no 
indication, in the dialogue, that Socrates himself agrees with or 
even understands these notions from Gorgias, Empedocles, or 
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Pindar. What these concessions from Meno do, in fact, demonstrate 
is that Meno understands poetic or metaphoric notions. This 
concession is quickly picked up by Socrates when he compares 
the definition of shape to that of color. Right at the end of line 76e, 
Socrates states that Meno would agree with him that the definition 
of shape is better than the definition of color, "if you (Meno) did 
not have to go away before the mysteries as you told me yesterday, 
but could remain and be initiated."1 0 Meno follows Socrates' lead 
and uses poetic language in constructing his third definition. The 
allusion to the mysteries is taken up later in the dialogue at the 
point where Plato introduces us to the doctrine of recollection. 
The series of definitions and refutations comes to an abrupt 
end around line 80a. Meno, having tired of Socrates insistence 
that one cannot know the qualities of a thing without knowledge 
of that thing, accuses Socrates of casting a spell or using witchcraft 
on him. The Greek here is instructive. Kai nun, hos ge moi dokeis, 
goeteueis me kai pharmatteis kai atechnos katepadeis, hoste meston 
aporias gegonenai. (line 80a). And now, as it seems to me, you are 
beguiling me and bewitching me and subduing me with charms, 
so that I am completely at a loss, (trans, mine). At the end of Meno's 
speech, he warns Socrates not to travel because if Socrates were 
to behave like this as a stranger in another city, he would be driven 
away for practicing witchcraft, (line 80b). The last clause of this 
passage rather effectively clarifies Meno's charge against Socrates 
here. The Greek is hos goes apachtheies. The goes referred to 
here is one who howls out enchantments, or a sorcerer. Meno's 
inability to accurately define the nature of virtue is the result of 
Socrates' howling. Rather than assisting Meno to see the problems 
inherent in his conception of virtue, Meno claims that Socrates 
has howled some enchantment and numbed him into inactivity. 
Meno's sense of unsureness stems from the investigation and the 
frustration of searching for something using an unknown method. 
However, in place of an admission of ignorance, Meno 
challenges Socrates. Meno presents the paradox which bears his 
name. Socrates refers to this paradox as eristikon logon, a debater's 
argument. The Greek here echos the division between those who 
are clever, disputatious debaters and those who are friends of 
investigation seen at line 75c. Meno has allied himself with the 
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former. The paradox is formulated is two ways, once by Meno and 
once by Socrates. Meno's formulation is "how will you look for it, 
Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will you 
aim your search for something you do not know at all? If you 
should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that 
you did not know?" (Line 80e). 
Socrates reformulation of this paradox is "a man cannot search 
either for what he knows or for what he does not know. He cannot 
search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to 
search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know 
what to look for?" (Line 81a). There is a subtle difference between 
these formulations,1 1 but that difference should not trouble us here. 
The upshot of the paradox is that investigation is pointless. 
Rather than directly undermining Meno ' s contentious 
argument, Socrates takes a different route. Socrates tells Meno a 
story about a mystery concerning the soul. 
As the soul is immortal, has been born often and has seen 
all things here and in the underworld, there is nothing which it 
has not learned; so it is in no way surprising that it can recollect 
the things it knew before, both about virtue and other things. 
As the whole of nature is akin, and the soul has learned 
everything, nothing prevents a man, after recalling one thing 
only—a process men call learning discovering everything else 
for himself, if he is brave and does not tire of the search, for 
searching and learning are, as a whole, recollection. (Line 81 c-d) 
We can understand this claim in two ways. Let's call these 
two interpretations the strong and the weak interpretation. What 
makes the strong interpretation "strong" is that this interpretation 
attempts to take into consideration the metaphysical implications 
of the myth in conjunction with later Platonic notions. The weaker 
interpretation focuses on the work the myth performs in the course 
of the dialogue. What is important here is that in the weaker 
interpretation, these metaphysical notions do not play any role. 
The strong interpretation is that, in fact, the soul is immortal and 
contains within it all knowledge. Through a careful process of 
investigation, one can extract or recall this knowledge from the 
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soul. The weaker interpretation rests on the rest of the passage. 
We must, therefore, not believe the debater's argument, for it 
would make us idle, and fainthearted men like to hear it, whereas 
my argument makes them energetic and keen on the search. I 
trust this is true, and I want to inquire along with you into the 
nature of virtue, (line 81e). 
The weak claim is that there is something besides knowledge that 
can guide inquiry. This weaker interpretation may not be seen from 
the statement of the doctrine of recollection referred to above, but 
it can be understood from the experiment with the slave boy. In 
fact, I would contend that this is the point of the experiment. 1 2 
The key term in the second formulation of Meno's paradox is 
the verb "to know". Either one knows something or one does not 
know something. Given that one knows something, there is no 
reason to search for what one knows, because one has the object 
of one's inquiry. Given that one does not know, one cannot search 
for it because one would not recognize the object of inquiry. If 
there were some other epistemic state besides knowing that would 
allow for inquiry then the paradox would not obtain. 
This, then, is what the experiment with the slave boy intends 
to demonstrate, namely, that belief can guide inquiry. Socrates uses 
a Greek speaking slave from M e n o ' s household in the 
demonstration. The only requirement Socrates places on the slave 
boy is that he speak Greek. Also, Socrates, later in the experiment, 
asks Meno whether the slave boy has been taught mathematics. 
He has not. The slave boy answers Socrates' questions boldly, and 
cannot find the answer to the geometric question concerning the 
length of the side of the square of the double length. At line 84a, 
the slave boy admits that he does not know. Then, something 
different happens. Meno is brought back into the dialogue, and 
Socrates compares the condition of the slave boy now that he has 
admitted to Socrates that he does not know. Socrates, at line 84c, 
claims that the slave boy has benefitted by being numbed and that 
he will come out of his perplexity while searching for the geometric 
answer with Socrates. 
Later, in the course of the experiment, Socrates draws a square 
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four times the size of the initial square, and then proceeds to draw 
lines that bisect each square diagonally. When Socrates asks the 
boy to consider how large the interior figure is, the boy still does 
not understand. This is important, because if we recall the advise 
Socrates gives Meno on how to properly define shape, at line 75d, 
the answers given must not only be true but given in terms 
admittedly known to the questioner. Socrates then has the boy 
consider the relationship between the initial square, the line that 
bisected the initial square, and the resulting square that is four 
times the initial size. The boy is able to recognize and explain 
these simple mathematical relationships, and then proceeds to point 
to the line that finally results in the square of the double size. 
Notice that the boy does not name this line, but merely points to it 
(line 85b).' 3 Socrates names this line the diagonal {diametron). 
The Greek here is instructive, because diametron literally means 
'a measured allowance' or 'ration'. 1 4 The verb diametreo means 
' to measure through' or ' to measure out in portions' or ' to 
distribute'. 1 5 Here, the word 'diametron' is being used in the 
geometric sense of the diagonal. Socrates, in fact, calls attention 
to this when he claims that wise men (sophistai) call this the 
diagonal. R.W. Sharpies notes that Socrates does not introduce 
the technical term until after the solution has been reached. The 
solution to Socrates initial problem docs not depend on the sort of 
expertise involved in knowing technical terms. Sharpies also notes 
that the term sophistai docs not have to mean 'the sophists' in the 
technically late fifth-century sense or to have some pejorative sense 
in itself.16 
At this point, the boy drops completely out of the dialogue. 
Socrates then addresses Meno, and draws out some implications 
to this experiment. What is revealing here is the language that 
Socrates uses in order to describe what has just taken place. 
Socrates does not claim that the boy had expressed any knowledge 
that was not his own, but that the boy had expressed opinions. In 
fact, when Socrates, at line 85c, claims that the man who does not 
know has within himself true opinions about things that he does 
not know, Socrates continues to use the term 'opinion'. Others 
mistaken in thinking the doctrine of recollection is offered as a 
theory of knowledge fail to note that all Socrates claims is that the 
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boy has true opinion. This is not the same as knowledge as I will 
make clear below. 
The remaining portion of this section of the dialogue must be 
interpreted carefully. At line 86b, Socrates makes the claim that 
he docs not insist that his argument is right in all other respects, 
but that he would contend at all costs both in word and in deed as 
far as he could that we will be better men, braver and less idle, if 
we believe that one must search for the things one does not know, 
rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out what we 
do not know and that we must not look for it. This is the retraction 
that I spoke of earlier in this paper. The question remains, what 
part of Socrates' argument does he think is not right? 
My suggestion is that Socrates is uncomfortable with the latter 
portion of the account: namely, the portion of his argument that 
these opinions were pre-existing within the soul of the slave boy. 
The weak premise in the argument is found at line 85d. 
These opinions have now just been stirred up like a dream, but if 
he were repeatedly asked these same questions in various ways, 
you know that in the end his knowledge about these things would 
be as accurate as anyone's. (Plato. Meno. line 85d. trans. Grube.) 
One might wonder from where have these opinions been stirred? 
There are two possibilities from whence these opinions come. 
Either the slave boy has always had these opinions, and Socrates' 
questioning has made the boy aware of them, or these opinions 
were merely possible opinions opineable by the slave boy because 
he speaks Greek. That is, given that the boy is a competent speaker 
of Greek, the expression of these opinions is possible grammatical 
structures in the language. If we inclined to believe the stronger 
interpretation, that the boy has always had these opinions, then we 
might be led to the conclusion that these opinions were always in 
the soul of the boy. Socrates' questioning has only allowed the 
boy to become aware of them. That would imply that the doctrine 
of the immortality of the soul must be assumed to be true within 
this dialogue. Of course, this is the standard interpretation of this 
passage. But this interpretation does not address the reservations 
expressed by Socrates at the end of the experiment with the slave boy. 
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On the other hand, if we are inclined to believe the weaker 
interpretation, that these opinions express possible grammatical 
structures within the Greek language, and the boy has proven that 
he is a competent speaker of Greek, then the stirring up done by 
Socrates' questioning is the result of taking advantage of this 
possible grammatical structure, and expressing it. This weaker 
interpretation does not imply that the boy's soul contains or does 
not contain these opinions. On the contrary, this weaker 
interpretation is justified in light of the one restriction Socrates 
placed on the selection of the slave boy, which is, that he speak 
Greek. Also, this interpretation does seem to make sense in light 
of the passage where Socrates compares knowledge to the statues 
of Daedalus. At 98a, Socrates claims that true opinions, as long as 
they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are 
not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man's mind, so 
that they are not worth much until one ties them down by giving 
an account of the reason why. Unlike opinions, knowledge remains 
in place. Prior to this passage, Socrates refers to a run-away slave. 
This allusion suggests a comparison to the passage with the only 
slave in the dialogue. 
We do not get a clear answer in the dialogue as to what ties 
down knowledge. Socrates refers to the account of the reason why, 
and what counts as the aitiai logismoi is not discussed here. The 
only suggestion we find is that if the slave boy is asked these 
questions and others like them again and again then his knowledge 
of the matter will be as good as one who knows. But, this takes us 
far afield of the position that I am arguing for. 
At this point, we might wonder whether my proposal addresses 
both how we acquire knowledge and the origin of knowledge. With 
respect to the question of how we acquire knowledge, the 
interrogation of opinions by means of the dialectic is the short 
answer. With respect to the question of the origin of knowledge, 
my solution is that all the dialogue warrants us to say is that 
propositions are the product of linguistic formations (noun and 
verb combinations) inherent in the home language of the inquirer. 
What my interpretation frees us of the need to invoke metaphysical 
commitments that may or may not be warranted from the dialogue. 
True, Plato does use language reminiscent of metaphysics 
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(immortal soul, previous incarnations of the soul, ex-corporeal 
existence and experience of the soul). However, this language is 
found within the frame of the account of what priests and priestesses 
say about their practices. That is to say, within the metaphorical-
mystical account initially offered to Meno by Socrates before he 
counters the paradox. 
So, if this portion of the account, namely the idea that the soul 
contains within it all knowledge simply on account of its successive 
incarnations, of the doctrine of recollection does not seem to affect 
the experiment with the slave boy, one must wonder what role this 
is intended to play in the presentation of the doctrine. That is to 
say, is this one of the portions of the demonstration that Socrates 
recants at the end? 
Returning to the initial presentation of the doctrine of 
recollection in the Meno, at lines 81c d, notice that Socrates defines 
learning in terms of recalling. Nothing more is said concerning 
the nature of this recalling or by what mechanism the recalling 
takes place. What we see in the experiment with the boy is that the 
use of dialectic is the mechanism by which the recalling happens. 
I draw attention to this passage again because, with the exception 
of the word "recollection," nothing more is made of the nature of 
the recall ing except that we recall things from previous 
incarnations. 1 7 In a very real sense, we really do not have 
recollection at work here. 
With these problems, it seems prudent to adopt an interpretation 
of the doctrine of recollection in the Meno that does not commit 
us to such problematic metaphysical notiions. I argue that the weak 
interpretation does not so commit us. Yet this interpretation leaves 
us with a few remaining problems. First, in what way does inquiry 
take advantage of grammatical possibilities in a language that lead 
to belief formation? My suggestion is that the example of the square 
drawn in the sand and used by Socrates in the experiment plays a 
vital role here. Recall that the slave boy points to the correct line 
that answers Socrates' question. Socrates names this line the 
diagonal, but the Greek literally says that it is the line that measures 
the portions. I suggest that we may want, in fairness, to retranslate 
this as the "line that cuts in half , because this carries the notion 
connoted in the Greek better than the geometric term. My 
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suggestion is that experience plays more of a role here than previous 
interpretations might seem to suggest. This is not to say that Plato 
is an empirical philosopher. However, this does seem to suggest 
that there may be more going on with this example that Plato takes 
advantage of when he reformulates the doctrine of recollection in 
the latter dialogues. Further, this interpretation does not address 
the nature of the questions Socrates asks the boy that leads him to 
the correct answer. I am not suggesting that leading questions are 
the only route to knowledge. On the contrary, all I am suggesting 
is that this is a further problem that takes us further afield of the 
interpretation I am working on in this paper. 
In light of the above, I reiterate that the purpose of the doctrine 
of recollection, as it is presented in the Meno, does not commit us 
to the stronger interpretation found in the later dialogues. On the 
contrary, I am suggesting that the use of this important doctrine in 
the Meno is to demonstrate how one may engage inquiry where 
one does not possess knowledge of the object of inquiry. As such, 
the experiment with the boy serves as an example of how one may 
inquire without possessing knowledge and only using opinion as 
the guide. 
Notes 
1 Although I agree with Charles Kahn, in Plato and the Socratic 
Dialogues, that each dialogue is a self-contained conversation, and that 
it is tempting to and even beneficial to read each dialogue as a separate 
conversation, nevertheless we cannot ascribe to Plato a multitude of 
various different philosophies. Despite this agreement, I think that it is 
vitally important to understand the positions and arguments in each of 
the dialogues as self-contained. It is by attending to the differences found 
in the separate, but parallel, arguments that Plato's real strength lies as a 
thinker. Only by devoting the time to understand each dialogue in its 
own terms, are we ever to be in a position to make good interpretations 
inter-dialogically. That is to say, to discover a vantage point in order to 
make comparisons between these separate, yet parallel arguments. This 
will allow us to attend to the differences in each that lead to differing 
conclusions. 
2 David Meiling, in Understanding Plato Oxford: Oxford University 
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interpretation, I mean my interpretation which does not attempt to take 
these things into the account of this doctrine. 
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Publishing Company. Indianapolis: Indiana. 1976. 
7 Plato. Meno. line 71b. trans. G.M.A. Grube, modified. 
"This is made clear by Meno's insistence at line 86d, on inquiring 
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to undergo the trials of a Socratic investigation, or this type of 
investigation is something alien to him. We do know from Socrates' initial 
remarks that Meno is a student of Gorgias, and that Gorgias accustomed 
Meno to give a bold and grand answer to any question, and that Gorgias 
himself was ready to answer anyone and that every question was 
answered, (line 70c). The idea that there may be questions for which 
there is no ready-made answer may be something foreign to Meno. 
9 Thomas Tuozzo, in "Why Are There Two Definitions of Shape in 
Plato's Meno" in Southwestern Philosophy Review. Vol. 19, Number 1. 
2003., discusses a number of the problems associated with the definitions 
of shape and the definition of color. 
1 0 Plato. Meno. line 76e. Trans. G.M.A. Grube. I think much, in this 
dialogue, rests on determining what work this phrase does in Plato's texts. 
Unfortunately, it would be inappropriate to fully explore this issue here. 
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"John E Thomas, in Musings on the Meno, has suggested that this 
difference is far more important that I am suggesting here. Thomas argues 
that in Socrates' reformulation of this paradox Socrates drops the qualifier 
"parapan" (rendered in the translation as "know nothing at all") and 
that this immediately destroys the thrust of the original puzzle. My 
contention is, whether we use Meno's formulation or Socrates', 
nevertheless we come to the same conclusion: either inquiry is superfluous 
or it is impossible. 
1 2 Roslyn Weiss, in Virtue in the Cave. Moral Inquiry in Plato's Meno. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001. p. 66, claims that what Socrates 
looks to the myth to provide is not an accurate account of what our souls 
have experienced and will experience when they are not in our current 
bodies, but a story that will convince Meno to live courageously pursuing 
inquiry, even inquiry that seems hopeless to him. What Weiss takes note 
of, in examining the myth, are some observations of Meno. The fact that 
he has some technical knowledge of Empedocles, his acquaintance with 
the poets and his sophistic training, all play a role in his believing and 
attending to the myth that Socrates tells him at this juncture in the 
dialogue. 
1 3 David Ross, in Plato's Theory of Ideas, 1951, makes this bold 
claim that the boy's discovery is purely and empirical one. 
, 4LSJ sv. 
, 5LSJ sv. 
l 6R.W. Sharpies. Plato: Meno. Aris & Phillips Ltd. Teddington 
House, Warminster, Wiltshire, England. 1984. p. 154. 
1 7 This is one of the main reasons that I want to focus on the 
presentation of the doctrine of recollection in the Meno alone. If we 
compare this presentation with the one found in the Phaedo* (lines 73c-e), 
what we find is that the notion of recalling is recast. In the Phaedo, we 
call something recollecting when one sees or experiences one thing and 
thinks of another thing. The example of the lover seeing the garment of 
the beloved and the image of the beloved accompanies the perception of 
the garment is used here. Notice that this is quite different from the 
presentation of the doctrine of recollection found in the Meno. In Meno, 
all we are told is that the soul recalls previous knowledge from previous 
incarnations. As I have argued, the number of incarnations does not affect 
the process of recollection whatsoever. So this seems to call into question 
the nature of the need for previous incarnations in the first place. On 
closer inspection, when we look carefully to the presentation of this 
doctrine, Socrates defines learning as recollection and recollection as 
learning. Hence, I would contend that nothing at all hangs on the word 
46 AUSLEGUNG 
"recollection" here. What Socrates intends to demonstrate with the 
experiment with the boy is that inquiry can be guided by opinion especially 
when neither of the inquirers have knowledge of the thing being inquired 
about. 
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